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Legal Accountability in the
Service-Based Welfare State:
Lessons from Child Welfare
Reformlsi_1157 523..568
Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel, and William H. Simon
Current trends intensify the longstanding problem of how the rule of law
should be institutionalized in the welfare state. Welfare programs are being
redesigned to increase their capacities to adapt to rapidly changing conditions
and to tailor their responses to diverse clienteles. These developments challenge
the understanding of legal accountability developed in the Warren Court era.
This article reports on an emerging model of accountable administration that
strives to reconcile programmatic flexibility with rule-of-law values. The model
has been developed in the reform of state child protective services systems, but
it has potentially broad application to public law. It also has novel implications
for such basic rule-of-law issues as the choice between rules and standards, the
relation of bureaucratic and judicial control, the proper scope of judicial
intervention into dysfunctional public agencies, and the justiciability of “posi-
tive” (or social and economic) rights.
INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in welfare systems in America and abroad intensify long-
standing uncertainties about how rule-of-law values apply in these systems.
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Programs that once focused on financial redistribution increasingly link trans-
fer payments to services, and services are increasingly customized to the needs
of individual recipients. The move to services is driven by the perception that
transfer payments alone do not induce (and may inhibit) the development of
skills that permit self-sufficiency. The move to individuation is driven in part
by a conception of fairness that mandates response to “difference” in people’s
values and circumstances and by the perception that these circumstances are
more fluid than they have been in the past (Handler 2004).
As the welfare state becomes more individuating and more adaptive, it
threatens to undermine the awkward compromise between rule-of-law values
and welfare state practices worked out in the Warren Court years and their
aftermath. Two key features of that compromise were (1) the idea of a balance
between relatively rigid rules to govern the conduct of low-status frontline
workers and relatively flexible standards to govern the conduct of profession-
als, and (2) the idea of coordination between a bureaucratic accountability
system for routine cases and a quasi-judicial accountability system for cases in
which beneficiaries protest their treatment (Simon 1984). In addition, the
compromise distinguished two modes of court intervention into the admin-
istrative system—routine discrete intervention focused on particular prac-
tices or narrow norms and extraordinary systemic intervention designed to
restructure entire programs (Chayes 1976).
The core tendencies of the new programs put these arrangements under
pressure. The need to customize and adapt makes rules an ineffective means
of controlling discretion. Effective review of frontline efforts routinely
requires the type of beneficiary participation that the old regime reserved for
cases in which beneficiaries complained. Because the emerging system
involves more complex coordination and more frequent adjustment, judicial
review of discrete judgments and practices seems less practicable.
Yet, at the same time they create new pressures, current developments
suggest new opportunities. In this article, we explore the possibility of a novel
and promising accommodation of rule-of-law values and the new welfare
state. We focus on developments in child protective services, especially in
Alabama and Utah. Child protective services may seem an unlikely realm in
which to discover rule-of-law success. Doctrinally, the field is dominated by
vague standards such as “substantial risk of harm” that connote uncabinable
discretion. Institutionally, the field has been associated with chaos, oppres-
sion, and tragic ineffectiveness. As we elaborate in Part I, a series of major
federal statutory initiatives failed to impose order on the state-run systems. In
at least thirty states, courts have found or defendants have conceded systemic
noncompliance with constitutional or statutory requirements on a scale war-
ranting structural intervention (ABA Center on Children and the Law 2005,
1). However, some of these interventions have made progress, and the model
we find promising has emerged in a handful of states. It may be because these
systems have been so deeply broken that they have lent themselves to
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relatively radical experimentation. Or perhaps because child welfare has
always been committed in principle to the individuation and adapta-
bility that has only recently characterized the welfare state generally, it has
proven fertile ground for innovation that combines these qualities with
accountability.
Our aims are twofold. First, in Parts II and III, we report on the consoli-
dation of a distinctive model of child welfare administration and suggest
that it promises improved performance (though we have only impressionistic
evidence for this promise). Some elements of this model have been themes in
child welfare discussion for many years, but one represents an important
innovation—a process of diagnostic monitoring called the Quality Service
Review (QSR). The QSR is an important contribution to the approach to
public administration we call “experimentalist”—an approach that seeks to
induce continuous reconsideration of a system’s norms in the course of moni-
toring compliance with them (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Sabel 1995; Simon
2006).
Second, especially in Part IV, we draw attention to the jurisprudential
properties of this model and argue that they complicate the longstanding
debates about the rule of law in the welfare state and suggest possible reso-
lutions of those debates. The Alabama-Utah model suggests a response to the
question of the optimal specificity of legal norms—rules versus standards—
that combines the accountability associated with rules with the contextual-
ization associated with standards. It is also pertinent to the choice between
bureaucratic and adjudicatory modes of administrative control. The central
process in this model combines features of both bureaucracy and adjudication
in ways that have been occasionally called for but rarely observed in the
literature on legal accountability in the welfare system (see Handler 1986).
Furthermore, Alabama and Utah have implications for the debate over
the proper scope of judicial intervention into chronically underperforming
public institutions (Chayes 1976; Sabel and Simon 2004). Reform in these
states emerged from judicial decrees mandating broad institutional form; yet,
in each case the court and the parties avoided the rigidification and arbitrari-
ness associated with “command-and-control” type judicial intervention.
Finally, the reforms we discuss have implications for the debate over the
nature of welfare rights. Legal tradition makes a basic distinction between
“negative rights” to be free from state interference and “positive” rights to
state assistance. Theory is often torn between, on the one hand, the insight
that any strong version of this distinction seems arbitrary in the light of the
relative importance of the social interests that a modern legal system should
protect and, on the other hand, recognition that the traditional notions of
right do not seem fully generalizable to the welfare system. But the reforms we
describe resonate with a conception of legal right that is responsive to the
interests created by the modern welfare state and capable of effective insti-
tutionalization across the legal system. The conception has been observed in
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the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court (Tushnet 2003),
which sees welfare rights as connoting, most fundamentally, entitlement
not to a particular outcome or benefit but to a process in which the relation
between the claimant’s interests and the values underpinning the relevant
public programs can be fairly and effectively considered. The Alabama-Utah
model is richly suggestive as to how this notion of rights, only vaguely
invoked in the celebrated South African cases, might be elaborated.
I. THE STRUGGLE FOR CHILD PROTECTION
The Federal Response to Abuse and Neglect
Abused and neglected children were identified as a social problem at the
end of the nineteenth century by lay philanthropies, most notably a group of
local Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC), the best
known of which were in New York and Boston. They gradually evolved two
competing perspectives. The “rescue” perspective, associated with the New
York SPCC, emphasized intervention and removal of children from homes
with abusive or neglectful parents, typically to institutions. The “preventive”
approach, associated with the Boston SPCC, emphasized in-home support
through social services and material assistance (Costin, Karger, and Stoesz
1996).
The public assistance titles of the Social Security Act of 1935 created a
federal program of grants-in-aid to the states to support income maintenance
and social services for “dependent children.” Foster care, one of the federally
supported services available through welfare workers, evolved into a routine
response to severe family problems, including abuse and neglect.
Concern about child abuse and neglect intensified in the 1960s and
1970s when the term “battered-child syndrome” was introduced into medical
diagnosis. The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
created a federal system for collecting data on child abuse, promulgated a
model state reporting statute, and directed federal money to state programs
protecting at-risk children. Reported and documented instances of abuse
soared. So did foster care placements.
A “preservationist” reaction soon emerged, as did a general impression
that the system was out of control. Critics complained that children were
arbitrarily and unnecessarily removed to foster care. Once there, they might
be shifted repeatedly from placement to placement, or simply left alone
without monitoring and reassessment. Investigations showed shocking
administrative disarray in the state systems; many simply could not account at
all for large numbers of children that they had taken charge of. And even
when child welfare agencies were minimally accountable, the routinized
nature of their responses was cause for concern; in practice, workers used a
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very small menu of interventions that took little account of particular
circumstances (Garrison 1987).
In 1980, Congress overhauled the child protection regime with the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), which set condi-
tions for federal grants for child welfare services, including foster care,
adoption, and family support. The act, as frequently amended, continues to
provide the basic federal framework.
Substantively, AACWA declares “permanency” as the predominant goal
for children in state care. It also mandates priority for natural family preser-
vation and, where that is not possible, for adoption rather than foster care,
and for any kind of family care rather than institutional care.
Procedurally, AACWA, since 1980, has prescribed the kind of indivi-
duated attention that has become a central goal of most welfare programs.
The caseworker, for example, must prepare a “case plan” for each foster care
placement that explains how the permanency and other goals of the statute are
being met. The plan draws on an array of services; the record must document
the “appropriateness” of the services provided, and the child’s circumstances
and the plan must be reviewed “periodically but no less frequently than every
six months” (AACWA, 42 U.S.C. sections 671(a)(16), 675(1)).
Case work is conceived as a process of “coordination” and “collabora-
tion” among stakeholders (parents, caregivers, and children), professionals,
and institutions. States are encouraged or mandated to create “multidisci-
plinary teams”; to “collaborate . . . with families”; to enhance the ability of
“community-based programs to integrate shared leadership strategies with
parents and professionals”; to “enhance interagency collaboration between
the child protection system and the juvenile justice system”; to support
“collaboration among public health agencies, the child protection system,
and private community-based programs”; and to foster “cooperation of State
law enforcement officials, courts of competent jurisdiction, and appropriate
State agencies providing human services” in responding to abuse and neglect
(42 U.S.C. sections 5102a(a), 5106(b)(2)(xi)).
The dialectic of “rules” (rigid and specific norms) and “standards” (flex-
ible and vague ones) has been a prominent theme in the AACWA. The 1980
text embraced family preservation through a standard—states were required
to make undefined “reasonable efforts” to avoid removing a child from his
natural parents, and where removal was necessary, to reunify the family (42
U.S.C. section 671(a)(10)). In 1997, Congress retreated somewhat from
preservation. The use of foster care, which initially declined after 1980, was
trending upward again. An important influence was the increase in serious
abuse and neglect cases associated with the epidemic of crack cocaine.
Another was the reappraisal of the “preservation” model, in part as a result of
research failing to confirm its presumption that children would usually fare
better if kept in their own families with supportive services than if moved to
foster care (Garrison 2005).
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Apparently fearing that the “reasonable efforts” standard was being
treated as a virtually irrebutable presumption, Congress, in the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), made an explicit exception to the duty to
pursue reunification for situations where such efforts would impede perma-
nency or where there were “aggravated circumstances” such as violence or
sexual abuse. In order to facilitate adoption, ASFA also mandated that states
initiate termination of parental rights whenever a child has been in foster care
for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months (AACWA, 42 U.S.C. section
675(5)(e)). Thus, Congress initially prescribed a standard, then perceived that
it was being treated like a rule strongly favoring reunification, and so pulled
back by prescribing an explicit rule limiting reunification efforts. Not surpris-
ingly, the ASFA twenty-two-month rule is now criticized as pointlessly rigidi-
fying the process, especially for the large number of long-term foster care
children who have minimal prospect of adoption (Ross 2003; Stack 2005).
The dialectic of bureaucratic and adjudicatory control is also prominent.
The original legislation emphasized judicial modes of accountability. Con-
gress mandated as early as 1974 that children have a representative (in
practice, often a lawyer) in any removal proceeding (AACWA, 42 U.S.C.
section 5106a(b)(2)(13)). In 1980, AACWA required that the states pro-
vide a “fair hearing” procedure for parents or caregivers who claimed they
had been improperly refused services under the act (42 U.S.C. section
671(a)(12)). Most importantly, AACWA sought to make the juvenile or
family court a key monitor of administrative compliance. The appropriateness
of the “case plan” must be judicially reviewed at least once every six months.
There must be a judicial “permanency” hearing within twelve months of
removal of a child and at least annually thereafter. And removal of a child
requires a judicial determination that the “reasonable efforts” at reunification
required by the statute have been made (42 U.S.C. sections 672a(2)(A)(ii);
675(5)(B), 675(5)(E)(iii)).
However, expectations for quasi-judicial and judicial oversight have
been disappointed. Representatives for the child can play important roles in
situations of high-stakes disputes, such as contested terminations of parental
rights. But they typically have high caseloads—100 to 150—and therefore
cannot often play an active role in routine decision making. “Fair hearing”
systems are not a significant influence in most states. Beneficiaries are not
aware of them, the systems have few resources, and they have little influence
beyond a small number of cases. Most cases come before the courts, but judges
typically lack the knowledge, the resources, or the inclination to undertake
searching review. Despite the AACWA requirement that judges must deter-
mine that “reasonable efforts” are being made in any permanency hearing, a
1989 study found that no such determination was made in 44 percent of the
cases (Guggenheim 2005, 189; Huntington 2006).
Moreover, judges who take their oversight responsibilities seriously
feel constrained by the limits of case-by-case intervention. They can order
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additional analysis, reject proposed placements, and mandate services, but the
efficacy of these alternatives depends on the larger system. Where workers are
overwhelmed, available placements tend to be unsatisfactory, and service
options are narrow, judges may accept as “reasonable” efforts that would not
be reasonable in a more adequate system.
In the 1990s, Congress turned to bureaucratic control. Statutes had long
obliged the states to report a broad range of data on their child welfare
activities, and the Administration for Children and Families of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services had long been charged with monitoring
state compliance with federal statutory requirements. Congress now sought to
augment and reorient such conventional monitoring in two ways. First, the
state (if it accepts certain federal support) must establish “citizen review
panels” (AACWA, 42 U.S.C. section 5106(a)). The panels, composed of
volunteers, including some with expertise in child welfare, are to review the
overall performance of the child protection agencies in the light of the
statutory goals and make an annual public report. The state must also arrange
for an “independently conducted audit of its programs at least every three
years” (42 U.S.C. section 671(a)(13)).
Second, and most importantly, Congress mandated what has come to be
known as Child and Family Service Review (CFSR). Reflecting growing
dissatisfaction with “command-and-control” regulation, amendments sought
to move federal oversight from a “compliance” orientation, in which success
is measured by conformity to rule toward a “performance” orientation, in
which the focus is on achievement of goals. In this spirit, the statute directs
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop a system of
federal review based on “outcome measures” that “rate” state performances
and examines “the reasons for high performance and low performance” (42
U.S.C. section 679b).1
Yet, for the most part, these initiatives have not borne fruit. “Citizen
review” panels have been formed, but they meet only erratically and often
lack expertise and access to information. HHS’s initial efforts at outcome-
oriented review were fumbling and often arbitrary (National Coalition for
Child Protection Reform 2003). There are some indications that they have
recently improved but only after they were reconceived along the lines
pioneered in Alabama and Utah that we discuss below.
1. The change in orientation resonated with the then-prominent “New Public Manage-
ment” literature, which aimed to improve public administration by clearly separating goal
setting from implementation and using reporting and incentive schemes to induce administra-
tive agents to achieve the ends of their political principals (see Harlow 1999). Executive Order
12,866 (3 C.F.R. 638 (1999)) required that all federal agencies, when feasible, regulate by
prescribing objectives rather than specific behavior.
Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State 529
In general, the federal legislative mandates have failed to coherently
reshape practice in the states. The progress that we report in Alabama and
Utah has resulted from state-level experimentation only tenuously connected
to the federal statutes.
Moreover, the debate between the “rescue” and “preservation” perspec-
tives continues. Commentators still disagree about the weight to attach to
natural family ties when parenting has been gravely dysfunctional. And they
continue to disagree over whether administrative dysfunction creates greater
risks of inappropriate removal (Guggenheim 2005) or of inappropriate failure
to remove (Bartholet 1999).
Public Law Litigation: False Starts
We have noted that in about two-thirds of the states, all or part of the
child welfare system has been successfully challenged in lawsuits seeking
systemic injunctive relief. The challenges involve demonstrations or conces-
sions of massive noncompliance with federal requirements—failure to take
action in response to indications of abuse and neglect; arbitrary removal of
children without reasonable reunification efforts; and placement of children
in inappropriate, often dangerous, settings without substantial consideration
or review (ABA Center on Children and the Law 2005).
These lawsuits have been based on the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause,2 on the AACWA,3 on the federal Rehabilitation Act prohi-
bition of discrimination in federally supported programs against the disabled,
and on state laws. Regardless of the particular substantive formulations of the
claims, the remedies tended to assume common patterns. For many years, the
general tenor of the decrees was to restrict discretion and force action through
rigid rules. In recent years, there has been a move toward standards, but both
rule-based and standards-based decrees have typically encountered problems.
Chris Hanson (1994, 230) noted in 1994 that “the common wisdom
among litigators is that the decree should be as specific as possible.” Marcia
Lowry, who brought several landmark structural reform cases, has asserted the
underlying view with exceptional bluntness:
2. In particular, on Youngberg v. Romeo (1982), which held that a developmentally dis-
abled person in state custody had a due process claim where the conditions of confinement
represented “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, standards, or
practice to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
a judgment” (322).
3. Some were initiated prior to the Supreme Court decision in Suter v. Artist M. (1992),
rejecting private enforcement of the statute. Some have been brought since 1994, when
Congress partially overruled Suter. See Charlie H. v. Whitman 2000 (discussing the extent to
which the 1994 amendment overrules Suter).
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People who run child welfare systems cannot be left to their own devices.
They will not use reasonable standards, they do have to be told “first, you
put your left foot in front of your right foot, then you put your right foot
in front of your left foot, then you do it again.” (Lowry 1999–2000, 453)
In this spirit, the most striking tendency in the early decrees, still
prominent in some more recent ones, is a preoccupation with deadlines,
quantitative measures, and specific procedural and documentation require-
ments. An example is the 1983 decree (later fundamentally revised) in the
Missouri case of G. L. v. Zumwalt (1983), where Lowry represented the
plaintiffs. The decree specified the amount of time that must be spent training
foster care licensing workers (two days initially, one day per year thereafter),
foster parents (twelve hours initially, ten hours per year thereafter in general
matters; thirty hours initially in prevention of abuse and neglect), case-
workers (one week initially, four days per year thereafter in general matters;
sixteen hours initially in prevention of abuse and neglect), and supervisors
(one week initially, two days per year thereafter). There are comparable fixed
deadlines for removal decisions, visits to foster homes, and the provision of
various health services; fixed maxima for the number of children in a foster
home or the number of cases per worker; and detailed rules about what
information must be in the file.
More recent decrees have moved away from the “command-and-
control” tenor of G. L. toward an emphasis on performance standards in the
manner urged by the New Public Management literature. The 2004 plan in
New Jersey is an example. The plan includes a discussion of broad goals and
principles and proclaims that it should not be understood as “a checklist of
requirements to be complied with, divorced from its larger purpose and
context” (New Jersey Department of Children and Families 2004a, 2004b, 2).
Instead of dictating practice, it mandates the formulation of plans to accom-
plish goals under the supervision of a monitoring panel, and it emphasizes
performance measurement as a mode of assessing compliance.
Nevertheless, these performance-oriented regimes are sometimes expe-
rienced as just as restrictive as the rule-oriented ones. The New Jersey regime
includes 240 “enforceable elements” prescribing plans to be formulated and
implemented within specified time frames from 6 months to 2 years. It sets
forth 22 basic systemic indicators (from “length of stay for all children by
entry cohort” (New Jersey Department of Children and Families 2004a, 207)
to “the percentage of children who have a substantiated allegation of abuse or
neglect within twelve months of exit from out-of-home care to reunification”
(210) and 98 “benchmarks” (from percentage of reports of child abuse or
neglect as to which the child has been interviewed within 24 hours (212) to
percentage of “new supervisors [who] receive the requisite pre-service training
before carrying a caseload” (234) on which specified performance levels were
mandated.
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The experience under these decrees has been frustrating and disappoint-
ing. Eleven years after negotiating the G. L. decree, the parties returned to
court with a substantially reoriented regime (G. L. v. Stangler 1994).4 The
need for redirection was recognized more quickly in New Jersey. The first
annual report of the monitoring panel concluded that the state had “failed to
meet the commitment for this monitoring period” and improvement would
require “significant course correction rather than minor adjustments” (New
Jersey Department of Children and Families 2005, 12).5
The increasingly recognized difficulties with both the traditional
command-and-control and the New Public Management remedial orienta-
tions are these:
(1) There is the danger of preoccupation with measurable and specifi-
able norms at the expense of amorphous but nonetheless more important
norms. Even the most restrictive decree must fall back on initially unspecified
standards for some purposes. The G. L. decree, in addition to mandating a
medical examination within twenty-four hours of custody, mandates that the
child’s health needs be “adequately met” (G. L. v. Zumwalt 1983, 1037).
Since it is easy to determine compliance with bright-line norms, enforcers
may be tempted to focus on them, while paying less attention to areas where
compliance assessment will be more difficult and controversial, for example,
the adequacy of the medical care. After several years under a decree resem-
bling G. L., a Utah monitoring panel complained that the agency “placed a
much greater emphasis on paper work compliance and compliance with the
prescriptive items of the settlement agreement than on the quality of the
day-to-day work with children and families” (Utah Division of Child and
Family Services 1999, 8).
The focus on specification and measurement probably accounts for the
tendency of administrators and frontline workers to perceive consent decree
requirements as a distraction from their core mission. Social work training
emphasizes general values of child welfare, informal and qualitative judg-
ment, and personal interaction with peers and clients. (Since several decrees
encourage or mandate the hiring of workers with social work degrees or
in-service social work training for current workers, they intensify both sides
of the cultural conflict between command-and-control and professional
autonomy.)
(2) Highly specified decrees freeze practice and inhibit adjustment in
the light of experience. Modifications of a decree require the consent of the
4. The decree was amended again in 2001 and terminated upon a finding of substantial
compliance in 2006. In general, the changes reflected the trends that were more fully developed
in Alabama and Utah, which we describe below.
5. In July 2006, the plaintiffs and Governor Corzine’s administration thoroughly renego-
tiated the decree and initiated reforms at least partially in the spirit of those we describe below
in Alabama and Utah. More recent monitoring reports have found substantial improvement
(New Jersey Department of Families and Children 2008).
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plaintiff or a court order, which normally requires a showing of changed
circumstances (Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail 1992). Such a process
does not contemplate routine modification, but social service practice needs
to adjust continually. Negotiation over discrete issues, even with cooperative
plaintiff’s counsel, can be cumbersome. The original Utah decree, for
example, required that all children undergo mental health assessments. It
soon became apparent that this was pointless for infants, but modification
took considerable time (8).
(3) Some decrees use indicators that are useless in setting priorities in
the inevitable situation when there is noncompliance. This is potentially as
true as for performance-based decrees, such as New Jersey’s, as for rule-based
ones like G. L. New Jersey’s first monitoring report showed poor compliance
or noncompliance with the majority of its 255 “enforceable elements.” But
a monitoring system that reports failure from all directions cannot direct
efforts to improve. Thus, the monitoring panel recommended that the
parties specify and focus on a small number of core goals. The state, it said,
should “attempt to do a smaller number of fundamental things and to do
them very well, rather than continuing to attempt to implement all portions
of the reform plan with equal priority” (New Jersey Department of Children
and Families 2005, 12).
(4) An effective monitoring regime needs both outcome information
that indicates how effective the system is in achieving its goals and diag-
nostic information that indicates the locales and practices that are respon-
sible for failures. Much of the information produced by command-and-
control decrees has little value for either purpose. For example, the number
or fraction of cases in which, within a given time frame, meetings were not
held or forms not completed and filed has at best indirect value as either
a measure of outcomes or a locator of failure (especially if the data do
not distinguish a total failure to meet or file from an inadequate meeting
or filing, and are silent as to the specific nature and cause of the failure
or inadequacy). New Jersey’s performance-based decree emphasizes
important measures of outcome—for example, frequency of reabuse in state
custody, the length of time to permanency, and the frequency of “reentry”
into the system after cases are closed. But by themselves, these measures
have limited diagnostic value. Low scores suggest that the system is
doing badly but give only the vaguest indication as to how it could
improve.
II. THE EMERGING MODEL: ALABAMA AND UTAH
A model of child welfare reform that avoids the pitfalls of command-
and-control, on the one hand, and single-minded outcome-focus, on the
other, is emerging.
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The model has been developed with exceptional self-consciousness and
efficacy in Alabama and Utah. Accordingly, we focus on developments in
these states and refer to “the Alabama-Utah model.” Most features of the
model can be found in other systems, and most follow longstanding recom-
mendations in the policy literature and, in some instances, prescriptions of
federal legislation. Their success in these states seems due in part to a con-
vergence of efforts by advocates, state officials, and federal judges who even-
tually came to take seriously the decentralizing themes of the literature and
legislation.
While much of the model represents thoughtful, disciplined implemen-
tation of established views, two features of practice in Alabama and Utah
strike us as innovative. First, reformers in these two states have developed a
distinctive form of diagnostic monitoring they call the Quality Service
Review (QSR) that furthers the aspiration to combine contextual decision
making with systemic accountability.6 Second, lawyers and judges in the
Alabama and Utah court cases have contributed to the elaboration of a
conception of social welfare right that emphasizes a system’s capacity for
self-assessment and self-correction over compliance with judicially derived
substantive standards.
Background
The landmark case is R. C. v. Walley, a class action challenge to the
Alabama system filed in 1988 and settled in 1992. Paul Vincent, the director
of the state’s division of family and child services at the time, was a progres-
sive social worker who welcomed the lawsuit as an opportunity to rethink and
restructure the system. The lead plaintiff’s counsel, Ira Burnim, of the Bazelon
Center for Mental Health Law, had been involved in Wyatt v. Stickney, a
pioneering structural reform case against Alabama’s institutions for the
mentally disabled (Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1998). Top-down
rule-based intervention did not sit well with the conception of practice
Vincent had learned in social work, and Burnim had become sensitive to the
limits of such approaches from his experience in Wyatt and other cases. They
and several collaborators decided to attempt a remedial regime that would
achieve accountability while accommodating decentralization and flexibility.
They were later joined by Ivor Groves, a former Florida mental health
administrator, who became the court-appointed monitor in R. C. (Bazelon
Center for Mental Health Law 1998).
Vincent and Groves both contributed to efforts to redirect the reform
process instigated in Utah through David C. v. Leavitt, which was filed in 1992
6. The process is sometimes referred to as “Qualitative Service Review,” or, in Utah,
“Qualitative Case Review.”
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and first settled in 1994. After four years under the initial settlement agree-
ment, the parties had returned to court in frustration. Despite an increase of
more than 50 percent in both state funding and the number of caseworkers,
there was virtually no indication of progress on most of the measures stipulated
in the agreement. In an account that foreshadowed the situation in New Jersey
some years later, the court found, “the feedback mechanisms designed by the
parties have proven unworkable or unrealistic” (David C. v. Leavitt 1998,
1212). There had been a “breakdown in the Corrective Action Process”
(1207). At this point, another visionary social worker—Richard Anderson,
then deputy director and later director of the state Division of Child and
Family Services—appeared and worked with plaintiffs’ counsel to reorient the
process. Vincent and Groves, who by now each headed private consulting
organizations, were retained to monitor and assist.
General Themes
The shift reflected in the Alabama decree and the second Utah decree
has been described as “moving from a law-based practice to a social-work
based practice” (Utah Division of Child and Family Services 1999, 8).7 The
phrase is apt in noting the influence of social work tradition, but it is mis-
leading in two senses. First, in connoting a notion of law as rule-bound and
hierarchical, it ignores that there are other conceptions of law and indeed
that developments illustrated by this case intensify pressures on the legal
system to move away from rule-based, hierarchical conceptions. Second, it
ignores that these developments are also transforming social work. They are
pushing social work away from its traditional proclivity toward informal and
tacit judgment toward a style of practice that combines individuation of
service with explicitness and standardization of explanation and measure-
ment (Roberts and Yeager 2006).
Key features of the Alabama and Utah decrees can be found in most
child welfare reform plans. Such plans virtually always involve commitments
to “system investments” or infrastructure development, such as equipment
acquisition or training for sophisticated information processing systems;
increase of caseworkers and supervisors, with a goal toward getting caseloads
down to some benchmark (in foster care, for example, fifteen to twenty cases
per worker); and establishment of minimum qualifications for workers and
supervisors (for example a bachelor’s degree in social work for frontline
workers).
In addition, the agency typically commits to monitor compliance with a
series of procedural and documentation norms. Compliance is reviewed
7. Paul Vincent described the Alabama decree and Leecia Welch, lead counsel on the
Utah case, described the Utah decree in such terms in conversations with us.
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through a desk audit of a sample of cases. The Utah process involves about
fifty “case processing” benchmarks. For example: Did the worker see the child
(reported as being abused) within the priority time frame (from an hour to
three days depending on the urgency of the report)? If the child remained at
home, did the worker initiate services within thirty days of the referral? If the
case involved an allegation of medical neglect, did the worker obtain an
assessment from a health care provider prior to case closure? (Utah Division
of Child and Family Services 2004).8 We noted such norms in command-
and-control decrees like G. L. They still play a role in Alabama and Utah but
a less central one.
Three other features of the Alabama and Utah approaches, though
hardly unique, are developed with distinctive emphasis: (1) a repudiation of
rule-bound authority in favor of a contextual understanding of norms; (2) a
distinctive understanding of the relation between the administrative center
and local units; and (3) an incrementalist approach to reform.
A statement of core principles is a standard feature of most decrees, but
these statements often give way to G. L.-type regimes of rigid specification. In
contrast, in Alabama and especially Utah, the authoritative pronouncements
emphasize that practice should be driven directly and continuously by
principles. “Instead of specifying the precise means of accomplishing these
ends,” the Alabama decree begins, “[this] decree lays out a set of ‘operating
principles’ or ‘standards’ and directs defendant to ensure that the Alabama
Department of Human Resources child protective systems comply with them”
(R. C. v. Walley 1991, Consent Decree, 2). The system emphasizes to workers
“the larger context of their decisions” (Utah Division of Child and Family
Services 1999, 9). Utah styles its basic norms as “guidelines.” Each section of
the guidelines is preceded by a statement of the underlying “philosophy” of
the norms. A few norms, mostly concerning process and documentation, take
a categorical form, but even they permit “documented exceptions,” where the
worker can explain and substantiate the reason for deviation.
The underlying idea—that norms must be both learned and elaborated
in the course of practice—is reflected in the reconfigured training that turned
out to be central in both states. A large part of traditional casework training
involved review of abstract psychological theory about such matters as child-
parent “attachment” without any clear delineation of the practical implica-
tions of the theory. The more clinical dimension tended to focus on rules and
compliance, typically taking the workers through discrete sets of routines for
separate stages of a case, from intake to closure. Training under the reforms
focuses on a basic skill set that is portrayed as central to every phase of
casework: “engagement” (interviewing and counseling), “teaming” (delibera-
tion), ”assessment” (diagnosis), “planning,” and “tracking” (follow-up). The
8. Data tracking on reporting on some of these measures is federally required (Govern-
ment Accountability Office 2003).
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skills are taught in the context of actual or hypothetical cases through written
exercises or role-playing. At the core of each skill is a capacity for contextual
judgment.
The second general theme of these experimentalist decrees is a distinc-
tive conception of the relation of central administration and the frontline. In
this view, the center articulates general goals, provides support for the front-
line, and monitors its success in achieving the goals. Frontline offices and
workers have relatively broad discretion to apply governing principles to
particular cases. As the Utah plan asserts, “if front-line staff members are
focused on correct priorities, and if the administration provides necessary
resources and removes barriers to getting things done, the child welfare
system can meet its mission of protecting children” (8). This idea entails, in
addition to a new style of monitoring we discuss below, fiscal decentralization
that gives local offices control over resources and the capacity to contract for
goods and services they deem necessary (rather then, as before the reform,
limiting them to a menu of standard options provided by centralized procure-
ment) (Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1998, 26–60). The central
administration also provides technical assistance to local offices to help them
build expertise in areas where the offices are deficient.
Incrementalism is a third general theme. The initial plans in G. L. and
New Jersey contemplated an immediate transformation of the entire system.
Alabama and Utah adopted phased implementation, decreasing the risk that
the center would be overwhelmed by the demands of reform. For example,
Alabama set a goal of converting about a seventh of its counties to the new
model each year until all had converted. Counties competed to participate in
the first cohort based on evidence of strong leadership and effective collabo-
ration with schools, community groups, and social service agencies. Success-
ful competitors received additional funds and staff positions, waivers from
rules impeding experimentation, and extensive technical assistance from
various consultants. In the course of training in these counties, workers were
encouraged to reimagine practice in a way that would vindicate the goals of
the reform. The pilot counties created local models that inspired and
instructed the ones that followed (30–31). Utah initiated reform across the
state at the same time, but in each of the five regions, it evaluated progress
separately, and it permitted separate exit from the most intensive monitoring
when a region met certain milestones.
Reconfiguring Practice
At a more concrete level, the contribution of the Alabama-Utah
approach lies in the way it gives practical structure to three longstanding
themes of the background legislation—customization of service, collaborative
decision making, and most important, diagnostic monitoring. In the latter
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area, the reforms have produced the QSR—which has important general
implications for the rule-of-law issues with which we are concerned.
Although it is useful to speak of the Alabama and Utah reforms in terms
of a single model, the model does not have a canonical definition. Many
participants see the core of the reform as the reconception of frontline case
work as contextual and collaborative judgment, sometimes called in Utah
and Alabama “the Practice Model” (and elsewhere, the “problem-solving
model”) (Huntington 2006, 674–87). Others put greater weight on central
facilitation of diagnostic monitoring, especially through the QSR. Despite
these differences, there is a consensus that both elements are crucial. What
we call the Alabama-Utah model is a heuristic that explains how the inte-
gration of collaborative casework with diagnostic monitoring makes it pos-
sible for administration to learn from local practice while correcting its
mistakes.9
Customization
Long-term casework starts with “assessment”—an effort to diagnose the
key obstacles to achieving the core child welfare goals. As the Utah plan puts
it, “the Practice Model will emphasize the search for underlying causes of the
incidents that threaten the safety, permanence, and well being of children”
(Utah Division of Child and Family Services 1999, 9). A training vignette
illustrates assessment with a case involving the “Archuleta family” that
begins with a report to the agency that young children have been left alone
at night (US Department of Health and Human Services). The parents
eventually return home under the apparent influence of drugs, so the children
are placed with a maternal great aunt. The father, whose drug use constitutes
a parole violation, is reincarcerated. After extensive investigation, analysis
identifies the following needs: (1) the children need a permanency plan
(returning home seems possible; long-term care with the great aunt seems a
possible alternative); (2) both parents have drug use problems; (3) the mother
needs to increase her employment prospects, so she can replace the income
lost from the father’s reincarceration; (4) the mother feels socially isolated;
(5) the parents need to maintain contact with each other after the
father’s incarceration; (6) the parents need greater understanding of child
9. We do not mean to suggest that this ambition is unique to Alabama and Utah. Vincent
and Groves have contributed to efforts in about a dozen states to implement variations of
their model, and other states have adopted analogous reforms independently (see Service
Improvement/Systems Reform at the Child Welfare Information Gateway, http://
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/service (accessed July 1, 2008)). Alabama and Utah seem
distinctive because of the strong emphasis on diagnostic monitoring in the form of the QSR,
because of the comprehensiveness and articulateness of their vision, and because of the
relatively disciplined and thorough implementation of the vision.
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development and parenting skills; (7) one of the children has delayed speech;
(8) both children are anxious about the disruption of their family life; and (9)
the great aunt/caregiver may need some time for herself (in addition to the
time the children are in school) and needs transportation to get the children
to and from school and health care appointments.
Training and review encourages workers to look beyond surface indica-
tions, using available diagnostic tools and data in a systematic manner. For
example, reviewers in a recent Utah case review faulted the assessment of the
child’s difficulty in school for failure to consider reports of educational testing
in the school records or to follow up on signals in the health records that the
child had suffered oxygen deprivation at birth (Utah Division of Child and
Family Service 2006a, 12). In another case that was discussed as exemplary
at a recent Utah review (one from a randomly selected sample), the case-
worker obtained a grant from a private charity to pay the expenses of
the nurse on the case team and the foster mother to travel out-of-state to a
conference on fetal alcohol syndrome to help determine whether to pursue
this issue with regard to two children. The diagnosis was eventually confirmed
and treatment initiated. (The foster mother later adopted the children.)10
Assessment leads to “planning.” Intervention has to be tailored to the
circumstances of each child. This means, to begin with, the basic principle,
established by AACWA, that removal to foster care should not be the only or
even the presumptive response to family dysfunction. Services should be
provided when they obviate removal and should be tailored to local circum-
stances. “Services must be adapted to class members and their families; class
members and their families must not be required to adapt to inflexible,
pre-existing services” (R. C. v. Walley 1991, Consent Decree, 18).
The service plan for the Archuleta family includes drug testing and
treatment for both parents, a visitation plan providing daily phone contact
and supervised visitation between children and parents, grants to the great
aunt/caregiver for daycare and transportation for the children, an arrange-
ment with the children’s godparents to provide babysitting relief for the great
aunt/caregiver, an agreement by the godparents to provide moral support for
the mother’s drug treatment efforts, weekly counseling at school for the
children, speech therapy for one of the children, and English-as-a-second-
language education for the mother.
Workers and providers are expected to adjust services according to client
needs. For example, if traditional parenting classes are not sufficiently focused
on a parent’s needs, workers should consider retaining a consultant who can
coach the client individually, perhaps in her home (Bazelon Center for
10. Each of us participated as a reviewer on Utah QSR teams during 2006 and 2007.
Otherwise unattributed statements about casework in Utah come from observations during
those experiences.
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Mental Health Law 1998, 54).11 Customization can also involve logistical
convenience. In a recent Utah case, when the caseworker and the father
could not find a parenting class compatible with the father’s work schedule,
they obtained the course materials, and the caseworker tutored the father.
A good plan must attempt to anticipate contingencies. From the begin-
ning, the caseworker should have a “long term view” that envisions the
desired conclusion of the case and recognizes the “transitions” that are likely
to occur on the way there. A plan for a teenager who is expected to remain
in foster care should include preparation for when she “ages out” of the
system.12 If a parent is to be released from jail in a year, the plan should address
the team’s position on how custody should be affected and what visitation
there should be.
At the same time, past judgments have to be reconsidered in the light of
new experience, and adjustments have to be made to unanticipated contin-
gencies. For example, in a case involving a teenager who had been put on
medication for attention deficit disorder (ADD) with apparent success, the
team decided to cut back the medication to see if it was still necessary. When
ADD symptoms returned, they restored the original dosage. This was consid-
ered good “tracking” practice. On the other hand, the worker in the same case
was faulted for failing to learn that the child’s school performance had fallen
off in the past couple of months, following a family crisis precipitated by an
injury to the foster father, and to reassess in the light of this contingency.
By insisting on flexible and tailored responses, the “practice model”
strives to attenuate the contrast between the “preservation” and “rescue”
approaches to child welfare. It does so by developing a range of possibilities
between leaving the child in the home and terminating parental contact. In
cases where there is doubt about the possibility of family reunification,
workers engage in “concurrent planning,” providing support with a view to
reuniting the family, but at the same time developing fallback options in the
11. For another example, consider the description of part of the service plan for a morbidly
obese girl: “A local council agreed to sponsor Jeannie and the homemaker [whom the agency
hired to help Jeannie and her mother with nutrition issues] for Weight Watchers. The Christian
Service Center provided diet food, treats, and drinks. A beautician agreed to provide periodic
styles and perms as rewards for losing weight. Other businesses donated clothing, toys, and a
bike, which Jeannie began riding when [the homemaker] wasn’t available to take walks with
her. Jeannie’s mother began coming home from work early to prepare meals, instead of relying
on the grandmother” (Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1998, 66).
12. “The long term view in this case is optimal. It is clearly understood by all of the team
members and contains specific written actions, goals, and milestones. [The youth] has plans to
complete high school and attend college at the University of Utah. She sees herself living in the
dorm but was able to discuss the possibility that remaining with [the current caregiver] may be
a more reasonable start. Funding sources are a shared knowledge of the team, and the worker
and [the youth] have a plan whereby she can receive help in purchasing a car. Part of her
long-term view is learning how to manage her time, think through her decisions, manage
her money, use a checking account and cook and clean. All of the team members are helping
her develop these skills” (Utah Division of Child and Family Services 2006b, 26).
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event that proves impossible. Even where there is no prospect of reunifica-
tion, continued parental contact often proves possible and desirable (39).
Collaboration
A central part of the caseworker’s job is to “engage and facilitate a child
and family team to support the child/youth and family including the out-of-
home caregiver and community resources” (Utah Division of Child and
Family Services n.d., section 300.4(c)). The child, if over ten years old
(Alabama) or twelve years old (Utah), is regarded as a “partner” in his or her
plan, as are the natural parents unless they refuse or there are extreme
circumstances. Foster parents, as well as friends and relatives whose partici-
pation is desired by the family and foster parents, are welcome.
Practice norms speak of parents as both right-holders and sources of
information and support. Involving parents and giving them a sense of “own-
ership” in the plan is an important caseworker duty. Review scores for “system
performance” are reduced when parental participation is unsatisfactory for
whatever reason. If necessary to permit parents to attend, team meetings
should be scheduled outside of work hours or at a parent’s home.
The other dimension of collaboration involves professionals. In the
traditional image of professionalism—exemplified in law by the judge and in
social work by the caseworker—the process of professional judgment is indi-
vidual and partly tacit; the professional is expected to draw on background
experience in a way that cannot be fully articulated. In the reform practice
model, decisions are collaborative and explicit. Key judgments are made by a
team, and the team is so cognitively diverse that its members must often
articulate assumptions that would remain unstated in more homogeneous
settings.
The team typically includes the caseworker, who should have a social
work or related degree, a health professional who monitors medical services,
two lawyers (the child’s guardian ad litem and an assistant attorney general
who represents the state), and a therapist. A teacher, tutor, or school tracker
might also join.
An example of the kind of reframing such collaboration is designed to
encourage was observed in a recent debriefing session among QSR reviewers.
The case involved an autistic teenage boy who was large and strong and was
likely to be perceived as threatening or disruptive when agitated. The review-
ers responsible for the case explained their high evaluation of “team coordi-
nation” by noting that the team had worked with the school to develop a way
of physically restraining the boy when he became upset and that school
personnel had learned how to perform these “take downs” without any appar-
ent long-term adverse effects. The narrative offered in support of this judg-
ment indicated that the boy had been restrained in school on five recent
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occasions. However, another participant in the review session who had had
experience with older autistic children questioned whether such frequent
restraint was necessary. He noted that disruptive episodes occurred less fre-
quently at home than in the school, even though the child spent more time
at home, and his caretaker was not, formally at least, as versed in the treat-
ment of autistic children as the school personnel. He suggested that either the
school was too quick to restrain or that it was insufficiently attentive to the
conditions that caused the boy to become agitated. Since the case team had
not considered or investigated these possibilities, their work was reevaluated
less positively.
Monitoring
Utah and Alabama use a variety of monitoring approaches, including
the type of “case processing” and aggregate outcome data emphasized in the
early G. L. and New Jersey decrees and required in some instances by federal
regulations.
However, the reformers use a distinctive monitoring procedure—the
QSR—designed to complement the customizing and collaborative features of
their practice model. The QSR was first applied in child welfare in Alabama
and has since been applied to child welfare programs in eleven other
states, including Utah. In both the Alabama and Utah lawsuits, the QSR
became the central measure of compliance in decisions to terminate court
supervision.
The “fundamental assumption” of the QSR is that “each case is a unique
and valid test of the system” (Child Welfare Policy and Practice Group n.d.
(b), 3). The QSR preserves the traditional social work commitment to forms
of supervision that respect the complex contextuality of frontline decisions
and encourage workers to respond to clients as concrete individuals. The
reformers contrast the “audit focus” of conventional monitoring to the
“qualitative” QSR approach:
AUDIT FOCUS: “Is there a current service plan in the file?”
QUALITATIVE FOCUS: “Is the service plan relevant to the needs and
goals and coherent in the selection and assembly of strategies, supports,
services, and timelines offered?” (1).
Yet, the QSR also aspires to generate precise judgments that can be compared
across cases and scores that can be aggregated.
The basic QSR process begins with a stratified random sampling of cases.
In Utah, the annual QSR review samples seventy-two cases for Salt Lake City
(out of a total population of about fifteen hundred), and twenty-four cases for
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the four less populated regions. In Alabama’s county-run system, samples
range from sixty-eight cases for the largest county to twelve for the smaller
ones. Samples are adjusted so that each office has at least one review, and no
worker has more than one, and so that there is a balance of in-home and
out-of-home interventions, older and younger children, and boys and girls.
The cases are reviewed by teams of two. Ideally (but not always in
practice) new reviewers take a training curriculum that involves an explana-
tion of scoring measures and practice case vignettes. They get feedback on
their scores until their judgments align with those of veterans. At least one
team member must be experienced; the second can be an initiate. In moni-
toring regimes under judicial decrees, often one reviewer is the monitor or an
agent of the monitor and the other is an agency official.
Case reviews take about two days. They start with a file review and then
proceed to interviews with the child, family members, nonfamily caregivers,
professional team members, and others (for example, teachers) who might
have relevant information. The interviews are informal but structured by the
basic norms of assessment and individuated planning that guide primary
casework.
However, the reviewers must ultimately score the case numerically in
terms of indicators. The current instrument has twenty-one. Eleven concern
“child and family status”: they measure the well-being of the client and his or
her family over the past thirty days. The other indicators concern “system
performance” over the past ninety days. The two sets of indicators respond to
the goals of what business scholars Robert Kaplan and David Norton (1996)
call “the balanced scorecard”:
A good Balanced Scorecard should have a mix of outcome [status]
measures and [system] performance drivers. Outcome measures without
performance drivers do not communicate how the outcomes are to be
achieved. They also do not provide an early indication about whether
the strategy is being implemented successfully. Conversely, performance
drivers—such as cycle time or part-per-million defect rates—without
outcome measures may enable the business to achieve short-term opera-
tional improvements but fail to reveal whether the operational improve-
ments have been translated into . . . enhanced financial performance.
(150)
The principal QSR instrument is a ninety-five page booklet with a series
of suggestive questions for each indicator (Human Systems and Outcomes
2005). (For example, for “Stability”: “How many out-of-home placements has
this child had in the past two years? For what reasons? Of the placement
changes, how many have been planned? How many have been made to unite
the child with siblings/relatives, move to a less restrictive level of care, or
make progress toward the permanency goal?” (18).)
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Scoring for individual indicators is on a six-point scale with 6 optimal
and 1 the worst; 4 is considered minimally acceptable. For aggregation pur-
poses, some indicators receive more weight than others. Weighted average
scores of 4 or higher for “child status” and “system performance” indicates
that the case as a whole is minimally acceptable. However, the “safety”
indicator is a trump for aggregation purposes; a case can be scored as accept-
able only if safety is acceptable. After preliminary scoring, the reviewers meet
to discuss their cases and particularly to surface and resolve any issues of
scoring.
Each case produces a summary like Table 1.
Reviewers meet with the caseworker and supervisor to discuss their
findings and the scores. Caseworkers can appeal the scoring through a
series of procedures that leads to central management, but this rarely
happens.
TABLE 1.
Child Status and System Performance Ratings
Child Status Rating System Performance Rating
1a. Safety of the Child
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When cases are aggregated, a summary for the system or subsystem looks
like the one in Table 2 from the 2006 QSR for the Utah Northern Region
(Utah Division of Child and Family Services 2006a, 4–6).
The reviewers discuss among themselves the indicators and information
from their cases that might explain their significance, and they meet collec-
tively with personnel from the region to discuss the diagnostic importance of
their findings. The final report sets out the aggregate scoring, generalizes
about what appear to be recurring problems, and presents illustrative
examples from specific cases.
The QSR serves three general functions. First, it is a form of clinical
training for the caseworkers and their supervisors. The experience of present-
ing an actual case in its particularity and receiving critical feedback on it from
peers and mentors is the core form of professional development in the social
work tradition (Munson 1979). Accounts in Alabama and Utah suggest that
the QSR has had major effects in changing the frontline experience of
supervision and review in ways that have improved both learning and morale.
A lawyer team member in one of the Utah cases we reviewed said, “The case
workers used to think of quality assurance as a way for the central office to
dump on them. Now they think of it as a way for them to show how good they
are” (interview, January 24, 2007).
Second, the QSR process is a form of norm elaboration through peer
review that engages all levels of the system, as well as outside experts. The
meaning of adequacy with regard to goals like safety and permanence or
practices like assessment and planning is, in the abstract, indeterminate. The
QSR is a collaborative process for specifying norms through analysis of cases.
The scoring system forces the reviewers to formulate their judgments in ways
sufficiently precise to permit comparisons across cases. The various discus-
sions among reviewers aimed at “inter-rater reliability” and the exchanges
between reviewers and frontline workers promote convergent understandings
of how the standards apply in particular cases.
For example, an issue that arose early in Utah was whether violence by
the father against the mother should be presumed a threat to the safety of the
child (and whether a recurrence of spousal abuse should be deemed a recur-
rence of child abuse). Consensus soon emerged that, if it occurs in the
presence or with the knowledge of the children, it should be so presumed.
State central administration officials who participate in reviews across
the state promote consistency across regions. The integration of outsiders
from other states or consultants with national practices promotes consistency
across states. Even where consistency is not achieved—there are currently
different views among states as to when spousal abuse is tantamount to child
abuse—discussion serves to surface issues for further consideration.
Third, QSR data functions as a measure of performance and as diagnos-
tic tool of systemic reform. The scores can be compared over time and (in
principle though not as yet in practice) across states. Moreover, they give
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rough but serviceable indications of where attention and remedial effort
should be focused.
Everyone recognizes that aggregate QSR data is crude as a measure of
system performance. Because of the cost of reviews of this intensity, it is rarely
plausible to get a large enough sample size for statistical validity, though the
statistical deficiencies of QSR data are mitigated by the availability of other
data. QSR data can be checked against and combined with quantitatively
denser data. Moreover, informal information gained in the review process
can add systemic perspective. Once the QSR process surfaces a problem and
makes it a focus of discussion, frontline caseworkers or managers may have a
sense of how pervasive the problem is.
More fundamentally, for purely remedial or diagnostic purposes, precise
systemic generalization is not necessary. For these purposes, it is more impor-
tant to spot problems and remedy them than to characterize the current state
of the system with statistical precision. Here the QSR designers share pre-
mises with modern business management perspectives like “Total Quality
Management” with its “zero tolerance” for major defects (Crosby 1984,
74–84). The system should strive for superior performance in every case, and
every substantial failing should be regarded as a problem worth remedying.
Thus, the designers insist that their sampling goal is to get a sufficient number
of cases that any systemic problem will show up in at least one of the cases
reviewed. They have no formula for ascertaining this number, but it seems
likely to be considerably lower than the one required for statistical validity at
high confidence intervals. To be sure, if the QSR process discloses a large
number of problems, some prioritization may be necessary, and it may then be
important to have more precise measures of systemic pervasiveness. But after
the system has crossed a threshold of proficiency, it may not be necessary to
worry about the relative systemic magnitudes of the problems disclosed.
A particular diagnostic focus in analysis of aggregate QSR results has
been comparison of in-home or protective service cases to foster care cases.
Indications that children in one group are faring worse than another are
treated as signals to reassess whether adequate and proper services are being
provided. For example, QSR scores for both status and system were signifi-
cantly lower for in-home than foster children in Utah’s Western region for
several years. The region focused training efforts on perceived problems in
these cases, and the difference disappeared in the 2006 review (Utah Division
of Child and Family Services 2006c, 35–36).13
13. In some cases, it appears that workers were underestimating the danger of recurrence
of abuse from natural parents. The administrators decided that the “permanency” workers
assigned to the cases had insufficient experience with the kind of serious abuse problems most
often encountered at the initial investigation stage by “protective service” workers. The
response was to assign protective service workers to consult routinely with permanency workers
on in-home cases (interview with Linda Winiger, Director of Practice Improvement, Utah
DCFS, March 19, 2007).
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Systemic Assessment in Public Law Litigation: Termination in
Alabama and Utah
In January 2007 the district court granted the defendant’s motion to
terminate the decree in Alabama, and in May 2007 the parties agreed to a
phased termination of the decree in Utah. Both actions reflect a conception
of welfare rights that sees process, rather than rule-compliance or outcomes,
as primary.
The Alabama decision shows how QSR data can be combined with more
narrowly quantitative data and more impressionistic information to assess
performance (R. C. v. Walley 2007). The decision squarely rejects rule-based
conceptions of compliance. The district court refused to treat as dispositive
the state’s extensive failure to meet the requirement of the 1997 federal
legislation that termination of parental rights be initiated after fifteen months
in care, asserting that such a “rigid time guideline” is not feasible or desirable
(48). Instead, the court looked more generally at the state’s efforts to achieve
“permanency,” as measured by the QSR, and it declined to consider even this
more general value in isolation from others. (An isolated focus on perma-
nency encourages a rush to get children into placements that are long-term
but not necessarily optimal.)
The most important measure of compliance was the benchmark, agreed
to by the parties, of 85 percent of cases with an overall score of no less than
“acceptable” under a QSR review supervised by the monitor. Each of the
state’s sixty-seven counties had met the benchmark at least once in recent
years, but some had subsequently regressed. In the monitor’s most recent
review of ten representative counties, three had not met the benchmark.
Turning to more specific indicators of the QSR and case processing data,
the court found benchmark compliance across a substantial range but also
significant failures. With respect to each failure, the court asked two ques-
tions. First, is there some mitigating explanation for the failure? For example,
the court accepted the defendant’s explanation that a large part of the
increase in out-of-home placements reflected an epidemic of methamphet-
amine use that data showed accounted for as much as 70 percent of intakes in
some counties.
Another example: Utah analysts found statewide that status scores in a major subcategory
of foster care cases—where the children are placed with relatives—were lagging other subcat-
egories. Administrators responded by focusing additional review efforts on kinship placement
cases. They concluded that decision makers had been giving too strong a preference to relatives
in placement decisions. They also found training and support for kinship placements had been
inadequate. For training and support purposes, workers had been treating relative caregivers
more like natural parents than like unrelated foster parents. Natural parents, on average, require
less training and support because they have experience with their own kids. Training efforts
were reconfigured to sensitize workers to the problems of kinship placements and practice
guidelines were revised to increase the presumptive training and support to relative foster
parents, with noticeably improved results (interview with Richard Anderson, August 18, 2006).
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Second, the court asked, did the agency independently identify the
failure and initiate plausible corrective action? With respect to methamphet-
amine cases, the agency had inaugurated collaboration with law enforcement
agencies. With respect to excessive caseloads, the state had developed pro-
cedures to track caseloads closely and to reassign cases when necessary. It had
responded to high worker turnover by increasing pay scales, and it responded
to deficiencies in planning with increased training and an effort to simplify
the planning process.
The court’s analysis concluded with a brief assessment of “sustainability.”
It approved the agency’s plan to retain much of the monitoring regime
constructed under the consent decree, and it noted that the regime issues
“report cards” published on its Web site for each county. It also mentioned
that the department will continue to be subject to review by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services and a governor’s “child welfare
commission.”
The court’s decision to terminate the decree is certainly debatable.
The opinion glosses over serious deficiencies in performance in the largest
county—Jefferson—where the city of Birmingham is located and which has
20 percent of the state’s caseload.14 Its discussion of how quality assurance and
other accountability mechanisms are likely to operate after termination is
brief and superficial; other than the reference to the report cards, there is no
discussion of transparency or mechanisms for continuing collective partici-
pation by stakeholder groups.
Nevertheless, the court’s framing of the critical inquiry is plausible. It
interprets the welfare rights claims in the case to entail not the judicial
elaboration and enforcement of substantive standards, but the inducement of
the parties to construct a process that will elaborate and implement them.
The key features of this process are transparency and accountability to the
public and stakeholders and a capacity for self-assessment and self-correction.
In contrast to the situation in Alabama, the parties in Utah agreed that
termination was warranted. Like the Alabama district court’s decision, the
termination agreement in Utah focuses on the system’s internal capacity for
diagnosis and adjustment, and it addresses issues of external accountability
more extensively than the Alabama decision. In the agreement, the state
14. The monitor concluded that “the data do not support a finding that the county is
sustaining performance in accordance with the R. C. principles and the five core purposes”
(R. C. v. Walley Consent Decree, n.d., 88). On the QSR, overall system performance was
adequate in 57 percent of cases. Child status was adequate in 97 percent of cases, but “child/
family satisfaction” was an exceptionally low 53 percent. About one-third of workers had
excessive caseloads. Nearly one-third of frontline positions had turned over in the preceding
year, and length of training had recently been reduced. In addition, the use of congregate
(institutional) care had increased “dramatically,” the percentage of siblings placed together had
decreased, and the percentage of children in care for thirteen months or longer had increased
from 46 percent to 65 percent (79–89).
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promises to “take steps to protect the integrity of the [QSR] process, as
necessary” (David C. v. Huntsman 2007, paragraph 19). It further commits to
maintain until at least the end of 2010 the key elements of what we have
called the Alabama-Utah model. These include the “practice model” (the
training and supervision associated with customization of services and col-
laborative judgment), the QSR, review of quantitative case processing data,
and a general capacity for “self-critique and analysis to improve practice”
(paragraphs 18–30, Appendix B).
With respect to external accountability, the agreement contains several
provisions requiring that performance data, including QSR data, and reports
be published online. It requires various periodic reports to the public, the
legislature, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It also requires
increased support for statewide and regional Quality Improvement (QI) com-
mittees. The QI committee members are appointed from public agencies,
NGO partner organizations, local businesses, and professional groups with
relevant expertise. They receive staff support and are charged with review of
trends and recommendations of reform. One provision of the agreement
specifically guarantees them the opportunity to participate as QSR reviewers
(paragraphs 31–35).
III. COMPLETING THE SYSTEM: FEDERAL REVIEW AND
EMPIRICAL RIGOR
The Alabama-Utah model is not a complete system of accountability. It
operates at the state level: a complete system requires national oversight.
Moreover, assessment of the efficacy of practice in the Alabama-Utah model
is short term and informal. Ideally, practice should be evaluated in terms of
more long-term and systematic data. However, the Alabama-Utah approach
can serve as a model for its federal complement. And while it does not itself
amount to scientific validation, it provides an important constituent of any
effort to achieve it.
Federal Oversight
In the experimentalist view of American democracy, federal administra-
tion plays an oversight and facilitation role by holding the states accountable,
measuring their performance, and pressuring them to improve. At the same
time, it assists them with technical and material resources and facilitates the
exchange of information among them (Dorf and Sabel 1998).
Federal oversight of state child welfare efforts has yet to vindicate the
aspirations of this view. However, in recent years, the Administration of
Children and Families (ACF) of the Department of Health and Human
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Services has developed an assessment process—the Child and Family
Services Review (CFSR)—that shows great promise. Despite limitations in
its current implementation, the CFSR has the potential to become an impor-
tant national complement to the innovative state reforms. The CFSR,
launched in 2000 and revised several times since, has evolved toward increas-
ing resemblance to the Alabama-Utah model (in part, under the influence of
Alabama) (Center for the Study of Social Policy 2003, 28–29). It combines
review of aggregate case processing and outcome data with qualitative peer
review of a sample of cases. It has become less punitive in orientation and
more diagnostic and remedial. Key federal officials see “continuous improve-
ment” as the core CFSR value (Christian 2001; National Child Welfare
Resource Center for Organizational Improvement 2007).
In states that did not already have qualitative monitoring processes, the
CFSR review has prompted their initiation. States that already had such
review have tailored it to complement the federal process. In some cases, they
have used QSR-type data to challenge the findings of federal CFSR review,
initiating the kind of mutual interrogation that is part of the promise of
federalism.
The CFSR remains a flawed process. For example, its audit sample is
small even by QSR standards, its performance measures blur process and
outcome in a way that impairs their diagnostic value, and its results are not
compiled or disclosed in a way that facilitates comparison across states
(National Coalition for Child Protection Reform 2003). Most importantly,
the CFSR currently selects its own cases for review, while a more plausible
procedure would re-review a sample of the cases from the state’s process. The
federal process should be auditing the state’s audit rather than conducting an
independent one; that way, its efforts leverage the states’ and integrate with
them directly. Yet, these flaws seem remediable, and the trend of federal
practice is promising.
Filling Empirical Lacunae
Even when amplified by case processing data and federally required
reporting, the QSR has two important limitations as a mode of social service
assessment. First, it does not control for the severity or difficulty of cases. This
impairs the value of comparisons of performance scores for different systems
or the same systems over time. Different scores could reflect differences in
the average conditions and needs of children in different systems, or in the
harshness of the social environments in which the systems operate, or they
could reflect differences in the system’s intake practices. A system that
assumes custody of children at a relatively low threshold of danger will find it
easier, on average, to reunify or achieve stability for children than a system
that intervenes only in clear cases of danger.
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Second, QSR data says little about the long-term effects of practices. It
provides a snapshot of current practice and the current status of children in
care. Thus, it usefully identifies both failure to comply with practice norms
and practice norms that are ineffective in the short term. But it does not say
much about the long-term robustness of practice or how well it develops
enduring capacities in its charges.
A fully elaborated system would deal with both limitations. It should
generate baseline estimates of the average degree of challenge involved in a
caseload that can be used to adjust performance scores for longitudinal and
cross-section comparisons. It should also attempt to systematically assess the
long-term efficacy of its practices.
It is important to note that such efforts, far from obviating QSR-type
processes, would depend on them heavily. Estimating a baseline of caseload
difficulty requires that cases be rated on relevant parameters in terms of a
uniform standard. It would be easy to integrate some such rating into the
process by which initial intervention decisions are made. However, for such
ratings to be plausible and consistent, they would have to be subject to a
review process with many of the characteristics of the QSR. Extending the
QSR to initial intervention decisions would be an important component of
an effort to generate a baseline of case difficulty.
QSR-type methods can also contribute to long-term assessment. The
paradigmatic method for such assessment, familiar from clinical drug trials, is
the random assignment controlled experiment. A key difficulty of such
studies in the social service field is the specification and control of the
interventions being studied.15 You cannot measure the efficacy of a program
unless you can see the extent to which it is actually being implemented. The
QSR is the best means of doing so.
IV. THE ANTINOMIES OF WELFARE RIGHTS
Discussion of the rule of law in the welfare system has clustered around
four antimonies: (1) rules versus standards; (2) bureaucratic versus adjudica-
tory control; (3) narrow versus broad judicial intervention; and (4) negative
versus positive rights. The Alabama-Utah model suggests responses to each
that moderate the tensions between their opposed terms.
15. For a discussion of methodology and an illustrative study, see Wald, Carlsmith, and
Liederman (1988). Abhijit Banerjee (2007) recently criticized economic development studies
that measure returns to investment in, for example, education without looking at what teachers
are actually doing or even whether they show up for class. Education is one of many areas in
which QSR-type processes could play an important role in assessment and improvement of
complex services.
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(1) Rules versus Standards
The Progressive and New Deal visions of welfare administration
accorded broad discretion to frontline workers operating under general stan-
dards. Both conservative and liberal critics in the 1960s and 1970s found
pervasive abuse of discretion and urged that workers be hemmed in by highly
specified rules (Platt 1977; Simon 1984).
A salient example was the formalization of decision making about
employment availability in the Social Security Disability program. An eligi-
bility condition for the program is that the applicant be incapable of perform-
ing any job that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Prior
to 1978, this issue was decided through an informal all-things-considered
judgment. The Social Security Administration, responding in part to the cost
of this practice and in part to concerns about the inconsistency across differ-
ent decision makers, produced a “grid” that mechanically dictated answers on
the basis of a limited number of factors, such as applicant’s level of education
and physical strength (Heckler v. Campbell 1983).
Yet, recent decades have seen an increasingly prominent countertrend
toward more individuation (Minow 1990). For example, statutes governing
benefits to developmentally disabled people, children in need of “special
education” services, and indigent families now require individual plans with
customized services. While the Social Security Disability grid remains in
place, Jerry Mashaw (2006) reports that dissatisfaction has led some to urge
that the system move toward “a community-based and multidisciplinary
approach that would deploy financial assistance, medical care, rehabilitation,
and transportation services, among other things, to promote the overall
well-being and highest possible functioning of disability beneficiaries.” This
new approach, Mashaw emphasizes, “would demand highly discretionary
judgments” (154–55).
Mashaw portrays this return to standards, discretion, and individuation
as a transient episode in a cyclical oscillation between categorical and con-
textual norms (see also Lipsky and Smith 1989). Another view, however, sees
the trend as more fundamental and secular. Surveying developments in
Europe, the Irish National Economic and Social Development Office (2005)
sees individuation, or what it calls “tailored universalism,” as a key theme of
an emerging “developmental welfare state” (203). Its analysis emphasizes that
recent social and economic change has upset traditional premises of European
and American welfare systems. Increased geographical mobility and immi-
gration has made the populations served by welfare programs more diverse.
Core beneficiaries of traditional welfare programs—women and the elderly—
have been increasingly pushed and pulled into the labor market, requiring
that the programs intended for them be redesigned to better accommodate
the mixing of public support and employment. Economic development has
increased the vulnerability of the less skilled segments of the workforce,
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calling for transitional public support that combines income transfers and
training.
However, this latter account has not explained how individuating, adap-
tive programs can respond plausibly to the problem of administrative discre-
tion. The Alabama-Utah model aspires to provide an answer. Child welfare
jurisprudence in Alabama and Utah is resolutely standards-oriented in the
sense that interpretation is purposive; specific norms are understood as
expressions of general higher-level norms, and interpreters of all ranks feel
directly responsible to the highest-level purposes of the system.
Yet decision makers feel pervasively accountable. Accountability arises,
in part, from the duty to explain decisions to others in various review proce-
dures, notably the QSR. This duty mandates, in the first place, articulation.
Decision makers do not expect deference to ineffable wisdom attested to by
professional credentials. Good case work is not considered adequate if it is not
consistent with and derived from a written plan, with accompanying docu-
mentation of its premises. A common complaint within the practice model is
that “the plan is not driving the practice.”
The emphasis on articulation serves several purposes. It facilitates
outside review of the team’s work, and it makes it easier for new members of
the team to acquire understanding of the team’s prior work. Equally impor-
tant, it facilitates the team’s internal functioning. Having to articulate their
views forces each member to think them through as clearly as possible.
Having to agree on a common formulation increases the chance that they
share a common understanding.
Rules do have a role in this system, but it is not the role contemplated
in the traditional jurisprudence that gives rise to the antinomy of rules and
standards. Their role there is to restrict discretion. In the model we are
considering, discretion is restricted by qualitative peer review and by public
reporting of monitoring results. The function of rules is to make explicit the
learning that results from the review process. Once review makes clear some
gap between the core purposes of the system and their expression in some
lower-level rule, the rule gets revised so that its guidance is clearer.
The simultaneous emphasis on articulation and flexibility appears to
increase the congruence of norm and conduct in comparison with command-
and-control regimes. The old systems were governed formally by relatively
restrictive rules, but in practice the rules were easily ignored. Paul Vincent
says of the Alabama situation, “Frankly, the practice-related content of the
manual got little attention . . . prior to the decree. Caseworker practice had
been governed more by worker bias and the local office practice culture than
State office influence” (Child Welfare Policy and Practice Group n.d. (a), 5).
The resolution of the rules/standard antinomy in the Alabama-Utah
model has a striking manifestation—it seems to have muted the century-old
debate between the family preservation and rescue models. The academic
literature on child welfare remains dominated by these competing
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perspectives. Yet, the debate is not salient among the participants in the
Alabama and Utah reforms.
The most important practical stake in the debate concerns what pre-
sumption or default rule will be applied in situations where our information
about a case is incomplete or inconclusive. In situations of doubt, should we
remove or preserve? The more ignorant or uncertain we are, the more impor-
tant the presumption. Thus, Congress and policy makers, remote from the
circumstances of particular cases and distrustful of frontline workers, have
devoted great energy to the presumption mandated by AACWA.
But it seems that when cases are looked at with the contextual intensity
and professional care that AACWA prescribes and Alabama and Utah fre-
quently achieve, the default norm is rarely important. With surprising fre-
quency, professionals and stakeholders can agree on what the “best interests”
of the child are without invoking any background theoretical or ideological
premise.
For example, in the first few years of the new regime in Alabama,
decision makers came to recognize that some of their family reunification
efforts were not productive. In these cases, they were providing elaborate
services over long periods, but the family situation was not improving. As
Paul Vincent remembers, “workers had gotten into the mindset of thinking
that every removal was a failure.”16 The QSR system identified these cases,
and administrators responded with corrective discussion, training, and guide-
lines. This reorientation occurred long before Congress’s 1997 reformulation
of the AACWA reunification presumption to reduce what the legislature
then perceived as excessive commitment to family preservation. In a system
with the capacity for careful contextual response and adaptation, the pre-
sumption was relatively unimportant.
(2) Bureaucratic versus Adjudicatory Control
The historical oscillation between rules and standards is paralleled by a
tension between managerial and adjudicatory review of frontline decisions.
On the one hand, the rule of law assumes that rules will be misapplied
and that misapplications will be corrected by adjudication. The Social Secu-
rity Act of 1935, for example, required that beneficiaries be afforded oppor-
tunities for hearings in both its social insurance and public assistance
(AFDC) programs, and the Supreme Court later held that such hearings are
often a matter of constitutional right (Goldberg v. Kelly 1970). The hearing
right entails an opportunity of the beneficiary to present evidence and argu-
ments to an officer with some measure of independence from the original
decision maker.
16. Interview with Paul Vincent, August 24, 2006.
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Yet, it eventually became apparent that the hearing process was not
adequate to accomplish the broader rule-of-law goals of cases like Goldberg.
For one thing, beneficiaries lacked the knowledge and resources to identify
legally questionable decisions and appeal them. Although rates of hearing
decisions for claimants were often high, only a tiny fraction of frontline
decisions are taken to hearing in most programs. There have been many
indications that large numbers of decisions that could have been reversed at
hearings went unchallenged. Moreover, in the few areas where appeal rates
are substantial, such as Social Security Disability and immigration asylum,
there appears to be broad inconsistency among hearing officers; comparable
cases are likely to be decided differently depending on which officer decides
them (Simon 1984; Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag 2008).
Such considerations led lawyers to argue that there was a “management
side of due process” (Mashaw 1974). Thus, the welfare lawyers argued for
“quality assurance” systems that would protect beneficiary interests by audit-
ing representative samples of frontline decisions, remedying the specific errors
uncovered, and taking systemic remedial action when the audits disclosed
patterns of error. Moreover, however adequate hearing procedures might be to
protect beneficiary interests, they did not even purport to protect nonbenefi-
ciary public interests in accurate decision making and efficient administra-
tion. Thus, conservatives joined the call for more bureaucratic control.
Such concerns produced an array of audit and quality control processes
in the 1970s and 1980s. These efforts, however, were in turn disappointing,
especially to those concerned with beneficiary interests. The quality assur-
ance systems typically paid more attention and applied severer sanctions to
errors that favored beneficiaries than to errors that harmed them. Moreover,
they tended toward the kind of rule-bound “checklist” review that rigidified
practice in ways many perceived as counterproductive of the goals of the
programs (Simon 1984; Lipsky 1984). The literature on “street-level bureau-
cracy” suggested that the activities of frontline public workers were effectively
unreviewable except perhaps for conformity to rigid rules that only tenuously
expressed the important public values at stake (Lipsky 1980; Wilson 1968).
In Alabama and Utah, the QSR motto, “Every case is a unique and
valid test of the system,” expresses the model’s ambition to transcend the
dichotomy between bureaucratic and judicial control. The QSR combines
the features of intensive concern with individual interests and stakeholder
participation characteristic of adjudication with the systemic review associ-
ated with bureaucracy. The idea is that, in a system committed to radical
individuation, intensive review of the particularities of an individual case is
the most important mode of systemic diagnosis. Cases are learning opportu-
nities, and review provides diagnostic feedback.
There are two key systemic dimensions of the QSR process. One is the
process by which individual case data is aggregated and generalized to achieve
indications of systemic problems. We have seen that the QSR instrument
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itself is a kind of “balanced scorecard” that links outcome and practice
indicators in ways that invoke causal hypotheses about system efficacy. In
addition, individual QSRs can provoke informal “root cause analysis” in
which decision makers reflect on the systemic inferences of problems dis-
closed in the cases. And QSR scores are analyzed with more quantitative case
processing data.
The other systemic dimension is a process by which reviewers, decision
makers, and administrators deliberate to achieve consistency in scoring cases.
The process aims at what social scientists call “inter-rater reliability,” and as
in social science, it is achieved through deliberation.17 Unlike judges in the
traditional view, QSR reviewers do not do their jobs “one case at a time,” and
they do not make their isolation from the systems they review a point of pride.
Unlike bureaucrats in the traditional view, they do not achieve consistency
through rules. Rather, they try to generalize across cases by sharing perspec-
tives and experiences in ways that strive for consistency without sacrificing
particularity.
There are, of course, important roles for adjudication, as more or less
conventionally conceived, in child welfare. Internally, child welfare systems
need administrative adjudicatory processes to respond to stakeholder com-
plaints. To date, such processes seem to play a minor role in most jurisdic-
tions, most likely because they have not been ambitiously implemented. In
addition, such processes are not well articulated with the processes of systemic
review like the QSR. Ideally, such systems should be related to QSR-type
processes, so that the information they generate can be combined with QSR
data and other diagnostic indicators.
Externally, traditionally independent courts are needed, first, to decide
intractably contested high-stakes issues, such as custody and termination of
parental rights, and second, to intervene structurally in response to persistent,
systemically inadequate administrative performance. To varying degrees, the
courts seem to perform these roles relatively well, and they could perform the
17. The review teams seem well structured to avoid the twin dangers of deliberative
processes—stalemate, on the one hand, and “groupthink,” on the other (Sunstein 2000). In
principle, the members share general familiarity with and commitment to the basic goals of the
program, but they have sufficient cognitive diversity that tendencies to unreflective agreement
are restrained.
It is possible that either through unreflective drift or bad faith calculation, the review
teams might turn out to be monolithically and uncritically sympathetic toward the agency in a
manner analogous to the portrayal by Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger (1999) of the evolution of
workplace grievance mechanisms. However, there are several potential checks on this tendency,
including: (1) the federal CFSR, which will audit or reaudit state cases with reviewers of its own
choosing; (2) the “citizen’s panels” required by federal statute, which could plausibly perform
their role by participating in and monitoring the state’s auditing practices (including their
choice of reviewers); and (3) stakeholder groups without direct authority, but who will often be
able to credibly threaten reform litigation if the agency’s efforts at self-assessment are demon-
strably insincere or ineffective.
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first better if they were relieved of much of the burden of routine supervision
they must now perform when administrative systems malfunction severely.
(3) Discrete versus Systemic Judicial Intervention
Lon L. Fuller (1978) raised doubts about the role of courts in the welfare
system by suggesting that “polycentric” claims were ill suited for judicial
intervention. Polycentric problems arise in complexly integrated systems
where a judicial mandate with respect to one part might ramify in unpredict-
able or uncontrollable ways to other parts.
Justice Black expressed a variation on this concern in his dissent in
Goldberg v. Kelly (1970, 278–80). If courts require welfare programs to afford
pretermination hearings, he speculated, the programs are likely to respond by
making it more difficult to establish eligibility in the first place. In fact, the
course of administrative reform in the 1980s validated this worry. Documen-
tation and verification requirements were increased, so that the process
became more burdensome, and a large fraction of applications came to be
rejected on procedural grounds (Lipsky 1980). And one can even find the
converse phenomenon. When a court ordered New York’s special education
program to improve its processing of eligibility determinations, it shifted staff
away from providing services to existing beneficiaries, and service to them
declined (Sandler and Schoenbrod 2003).
Polycentricity calls for systemic intervention, but systemic intervention
involves a different problem. The courts despair of deriving and enforcing
determinate norms for the conduct of an entire system. Such concerns some-
times lead them to hold even statutory mandates of systemic practice judi-
cially unenforceable (Pennhurst State School v. Halderman 1981; Suter v. Artist
M. 1992).
However, the kind of judicial intervention exemplified by Alabama and
Utah is a response to polycentric problems that does not require the court to
analytically derive a system on its own. The Alabama-Utah approach enables
the court to induce an agency that has persistently failed to meet its respon-
sibilities to reform in collaboration with injured stakeholders in a way that is
both accountable and transparent. Far from imposing the kind of rigid and
arbitrary regime that some critics of structural remedies fear, it inhibits
administrative rigidity and arbitrariness by inducing the agency to develop its
capacities to assess itself and respond to experience.
Paradoxically, there is a sense in which the broadest remedies are the
least intrusive. The ideal structural decree requires no more than what good
management and democratic accountability would require in the absence of
judicial intervention. The Alabama-Utah approach comes much closer to
this ideal than its command-and-control predecessors. In cases that have
taken this direction, there are fewer complaints from defendants that
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court-imposed monitoring is a burdensome distraction. Indeed, the Utah plan
said that it was “first and foremost, a business plan which the Division intends
to implement voluntarily with or without further court involvement” (Utah
Division of Child and Family Services 1999, 5).
One indication that broad intervention can be less intrusive is that
defendants sometimes collaborate with plaintiffs in order to broaden classes
to avoid the arbitrary effects of narrow intervention. The holdings of Suter
v. Artist M. (1992) and cases that preceded it, denying a private right to
enforce AACWA, were intended to limit the possibilities of broad inter-
vention. With AACWA unavailable, the most salient alternative grounds
were the substantive due process claim of Youngberg v. Romeo (1982), which
was predicated on state custody and the antidiscrimination norm of the
Rehabilitation Act, which was limited to people with disabilities. Remedies
limited to children in custody or with diagnosed disabilities would have
created pressure to take custody of children simply in order to make them
eligible for needed services or to give them diagnoses of mental health
disabilities for the same reason. Such pressures had been experienced in the
North Carolina Willie M. case, where the class was limited to children in
custody with mental health problems (Dodge, Kupersmidt, and Fontaine
n.d.). Mindful of this experience, plaintiffs and the defendant in Alabama,
first, agreed to include in the class both children in custody with mental
health problems and children “at risk” of being taken into custody and
developing mental health problems and, second, stipulated that all children
at risk of being taken into custody were at risk of developing mental health
problems (Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1998, 16–17). Confining
the court to narrow intervention constrains its discretion only at the cost of
arbitrariness.
(4) Negative versus Positive Rights
The canonical statement of the priority of negative rights in American
constitutional law—DeShaney v. Winnebago Department of Social Services
(1989)—arose in the child abuse-and-neglect area. The Supreme Court held
that the reckless failure of the state to protect a child from severe parental
abuse did not constitute actionable deprivation of “life, liberty, and property”
under the civil rights laws.
The traditional objection to positive constitutional rights is that the
relevant principles are indeterminate. Theorists contend that welfare pro-
grams are not underpinned by a body of evolving but specifiable social norms
comparable to those that give coherence to judicial decision making about
private rights. Welfare systems lack the self-adjusting properties of private
markets; they have to be steered by bureaucracies under political supervision.
Thus, judicial intervention along traditional rule-of-law lines disrupts
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political accountability and threatens rigidity or arbitrariness or both (Hayek
1944; Dennis and Stewart 2004; Teubner 1986).
To the extent that the indeterminacy claim is true, it implies a terrible
trade-off. Either we must exempt from the strongest rule-of-law protection
some of the most basic and important interests of a broad fraction of the
population, or we must empower or burden the courts with the task of
defining and enforcing standards that are not susceptible to coherent judicial
elaboration.
Child welfare provides an especially striking example of the arbitrariness
of the distinction between negative and positive rights in any effort to impose
rule-of-law values on the welfare state. Perhaps the least controversial propo-
sition in the field is that a state’s failure to provide services to troubled
families increases the likelihood that children will be removed. It strikes
many as incoherent to give priority to a negative right against unnecessary
child removal over a positive right to services that would obviate removal.
Fortunately, the more promising child welfare cases and recent public
law litigation in other areas suggest a conception of public right that eludes
the distinction between negative and positive rights and a mode of enforce-
ment that could be applied as readily in situations of wrongful state action and
situations of wrongful failure to act (Sabel and Simon 2004).
At the most general level, the core welfare right is an entitlement to
have one’s interests in a public program considered in a process that is
responsive and accountable. The “interests” in question are those relevant to
the core values of the program. “Responsive” implies consideration of the
relation of the claimant’s interests to the relevant public purposes and at least
minimal participation by the claimant. “Accountability” implies a reasoned
explanation by the decision makers, review of decisions in ways that provide
rich assessments of both individual cases and the system as a whole, and
transparent procedures of systemic self-assessment and self-correction18
(Handler 1986).
The prima facie case of a violation of this type of public law right is a
showing of, first, the state’s chronic failure to meet relevant standards of
performance in the area and, second, immunity of the system to conventional
forces of political correction. The remedy that follows from a finding of
liability is not a judicially imposed code, but a judicial order that the system
negotiate and implement with the claimants and other stakeholders a reform
program that is accountable in the ways suggested by the Alabama and Utah
reforms.
18. The accountability connoted by the rule of law runs in several directions: (1) account-
ability to individual claimants; (2) accountability of lower-level decision makers to upper-level
decision makers; (3) accountability of the agency as a whole to the other branches of govern-
ment, stakeholder communities, and the general public. The QSR contributes directly and
powerfully to the second and third kind of accountability. It also contributes to the first, but it
needs to be supplemented by processes in which claimants can initiate review.
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The shadow of such a conception of social rights can be found in the
holding of the Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) that due process
requires certain welfare decisions to be based on “professional judgment”
(322). Youngberg is impaired by its limitation to rights that can be styled as
“negative” (for example, on the facts of the case, rights premised on state
custody of the plaintiff) and its undeveloped conception of “professional
judgment.” But it seems to contemplate something like the prima facie case
we propose—failure to meet basic standards and political closure to key
stakeholders. And the remedial practice in the cases brought under it, we
have seen, is gradually converging along the lines of Utah and Alabama.
Other relevant doctrinal touchstones are the celebrated decisions of the
South Africa Constitutional Court in South Africa v. Grootboom (2000) and
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002). Grootboom
held that the state could not constitutionally facilitate the eviction of a large
group of homeless people when it had failed to make reasonable provision for
people in their situation in its subsidized housing programs. TAC held that
the state acted unconstitutionally in withholding antiretroviral drugs from
pregnant women and nursing mothers with HIV. The cases are notoriously
ambiguous, but a key theme in Grootboom is political exclusion, and a key
theme in TAC is a violation of basic standards. These are the elements of our
public law right. In both cases the remedy—an order to the state to reform its
program in ways that make “reasonable” provision for the interests of the
claimants—seems consistent with American public law litigation. The devel-
opments we have reported suggest how such mandates might be elaborated.
This is not the place for a full-scale account of welfare rights, but we
should take note of some ways in which the Alabama-Utah experience
responds to the conventional objections to the justiciability of positive rights.
The first objection is that such rights cannot be coherently specified.
The objection is confirmed by our cases to the extent that it suggests that
courts cannot specify detailed rules for running welfare programs, but it is
refuted to the extent that it suggests that such specification is needed for
effective intervention.
What courts need to be able to do to enforce public law rights is, first, to
determine when programs are chronically and fundamentally failing to meet
their commitments and, second, to trigger and facilitate experimentalist
reform. Structural reform cases in child welfare and elsewhere strongly
support the claim that they are capable of these tasks. Liability determina-
tions in these cases are rarely even contested after the motion phase, and few
critics of these cases deny that the systems are broken. Note that legal
determinacy in these cases does not depend on constitutional or statutory
rules. The specific doctrinal basis of the claims seems to have little influence
on the trajectory of intervention. Substantive consistency in liability deter-
minations arises from the standards of “professional judgment” that the
courts, in the manner of Youngberg, apply to assess agency performance. And
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it seems to be arising in the formulation of remedies from mutual learning
across cases about the efficacy of alternative structures.
The second objection is that the enforcement of positive rights requires
the reallocation of scarce resources at the expense of usually unidentifiable
but potentially equally important interests. We have not undertaken the
conceptually and practically difficult task of assessing whether and to what
extent the Alabama and Utah reforms increased expenses. They clearly
required increased appropriations in the short term. In the long term,
however, many would expect the reforms to reduce expenditures by decreas-
ing the number of removals to foster care (which tends to be more costly than
natural family support), minimizing the use of congregate care (in general the
most expensive intervention), and speeding the time to “permanency.”19
Moreover, states typically find that good management increases access to
outside funding. A key component of most reform plans is the reorganization
of efforts to maximize federal reimbursement under Medicaid, Supplemental
Security Income, and the child welfare programs of the Social Security Act.
Creative local efforts often draw money from churches and foundations. To
the extent that competitively awarded grant money is drawn to reformed
programs—because they seem to offer a higher social return—the objection
that positive rights enforcement cannot take account of the relative values of
competing uses seems wrong.
The most fundamental point, however, is that experimentalist inter-
vention, if successful, is not zero-sum and need not, in principle, cost
anything. In business, a prominent slogan in an influential school of man-
agement literature is, “Quality is free” (Crosby 1984). No doubt it is an
exaggeration, but it expresses the basic insight that value can be created
through reorganization.
The third criticism is that the courts lack either the political legitimacy
or the political power to mandate broad scale public reforms. With respect to
legitimacy, consider that experimentalist reform can induce judicial account-
ability in the same way that it induces administrative accountability. The
mechanisms of review, assessment, and transparency that courts impose on
defendants can be used to assess the legitimacy and efficacy of the courts’
efforts. Appellate courts can assess the plausibility of the parties’ statement of
relevant legal standards, of the appropriateness of the indicators they have
chosen to measure their performance, and what improvement these measures
show.
Experimentalist reforms also facilitate legislative oversight by making
program performance more transparent. The Utah experience also shows a
19. A key difficulty in assessing the increase in expenses due to the intervention would be
constructing the baseline of what expenses would be in the absence of intervention. To do so
would require controlling for variations in the social forces that affect family dysfunction.
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further distinctive innovation in the possibilities of legislative oversight.
More than a dozen state legislators have participated in the QSR process as
reviewers.20
As for political power, the Alabama experience shows the importance of
political support, but it also suggests that political support is not exogenous to
the remedial regime. The Alabama reforms were initially supported by the
agency leadership, which assisted the plaintiffs in developing support from
the governor and the legislature. Subsequently, a new governor was elected
on an antiwelfare backlash platform that explicitly proposed to undo the
reforms and oppose continued federal court intervention. The new regime did
serious damage to the reforms but not nearly as much as it sought to do. The
dismantling efforts were vigorously opposed by a coalition of NGOs, by
prominent newspaper editorialists, and by some legislators. Among the key
actors in the campaign to save the reforms was a statewide Parents Support
Network. The network was formed under the reforms as a forum for moral
support and information exchange, but it also played an important role in
lobbying the legislature for adequate resources (Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law 1998). The effectiveness of the opposition to the new governor
suggests that successful experimentalist reform may generate its own political
support. It also suggests that reforms may organize otherwise vulnerable stake-
holder constituencies in ways that make the reforms politically more stable.
CONCLUSION
Alabama and Utah have produced a distinctive model of child welfare
administration that incorporates some longstanding reform prescriptions and
adds an innovative form of diagnostic monitoring. We have reported impres-
sionistic evidence that the model is responsible for dramatic improvement in
both states and is becoming influential elsewhere. More systematically, we
have argued that the model gives new perspective to longstanding debates
about legal accountability in the welfare state and illustrates a form of
accountability of frontline decision making that does not entail the rigidifi-
cation of practice. It seems readily generalizable to other service-based welfare
programs and especially responsive to the increasing tendency of such pro-
grams to aspire to adaptability and customization. Most generally, it suggests
ways in which the conception of “positive” or “social” constitutional rights
hinted at in some prominent recent discussions might be elaborated.
20. Interview with Richard Anderson, August 18, 2006. Legislative oversight is often
thought to be limited to “police patrol” procedures that audit for compliance with fixed rules
and “fire alarm” procedures that respond to reports of discrete abuses (McCubbins and Schwartz
1984). The QSR suggests an alternative that could provide far richer information.
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